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Abstract
Depersonalization-Derealization Disorder (DD) typically manifests as a disruption of body self-awareness. Interoception 2
defined as the cognitive processing of body signals2 has been extensively considered as a key processing for body self-
awareness. In consequence, the purpose of this study was to investigate whether there are systematic differences in
interoception between a patient with DD and controls that might explain the disembodiment symptoms suffered in this
disease. To assess interoception, we utilized a heartbeat detection task and measures of functional connectivity derived
from fMRI networks in interoceptive/exteroceptivo/mind-wandering states. Additionally, we evaluated empathic abilities to
test the association between interoception and emotional experience. The results showed patient’s impaired performance
in the heartbeat detection task when compared to controls. Furthermore, regarding functional connectivity, we found a
lower global brain connectivity of the patient relative to controls only in the interoceptive state. He also presented a
particular pattern of impairments in affective empathy. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental research that
assesses the relationship between interoception and DD combining behavioral and neurobiological measures. Our results
suggest that altered neural mechanisms and cognitive processes regarding body signaling might be engaged in DD
phenomenology. Moreover, our study contributes experimental data to the comprehension of brain-body interactions and
the emergence of self-awareness and emotional feelings.
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Introduction
Between 0.95% [1] and 2.4% [2] of the general population
suffers from Depersonalization-Derealization Disorder (DD) [3], a
syndrome characterized by a profound disruption of self-aware-
ness [4]. Four main experiential components are described in this
disorder: (1) feelings of disembodiment, which refers to the sense of
detachment or disconnection from the body; (2) subjective
emotional numbing, an inability to experience emotions and
empathy; (3) anomalous subjective recall, a lack of ownership
when remembering personal information or imagining things; and
(4) derealization, an experience of feeling estranged or alienated
from surroundings [4]. The description of a DD patient reflects
how severe these symptoms may be: ‘‘I feel as though I’m not
alive, as though my body is an empty, lifeless shell […] I seem to
be walking in a world I recognize but don’t feel [5].’’ Compared to
hallucinating and delusional experiences, DD patients retain
insight that these are subjective phenomena rather than the
objective reality [6,7].
Regarding the emotional and social cognition profile, DD
patients rate unpleasant pictures as less emotional [8] or less
arousing [9]. Based on a the Empathy Quotient (EQ) [10], a self-
reported empathy scale, studies report an overall deficit in
empathic abilities [11] in this disease, driven mostly by patients’
lower scores in the spontaneous use of social skills and lack of
intuitive social understanding [10,11]. In the same vein, DD
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patients present a lack of congruent physiological arousal in
response to emotive narratives [11], suggesting difficulties in
parallel affective empathy (experience an emotion that is congruent
to that of a protagonist) [12]. Research using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) reports decreased activity within neural
regions engaged in emotional processing, such as the anterior
insular cortex (AIC), amygdala, hippocampus, superior temporal
gyrus, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in DD patients while
processing emotionally salient stimuli [8,13–15]. Together, these
studies converge to indicate that DD patients suffer from deficits in
their empathic abilities and that they are unable to imbue
perceived objects or concrete situations with emotional feelings
[16].
In contrast to this lack of subjective emotional feelings, DD
patients present an overall adequate emotional expression [4].
This discrepancy between subjective experience and the expres-
sion of emotions supports the idea that in DD there is a disruption
of the process that allows emotions to gain conscious representa-
tion (usually called emotional awareness) instead of a global
dysfunction of emotional processing [4].
A complementary research program has consistently established
a relationship among interoception 2defined as the perception of
afferent visceral information from the body2, empathy and
emotional awareness [17–27].
Subjects with higher interoceptive sensitivity rate positive and
negative emotional stimuli as more arousing [22], intense [28] and
stressful [25] than subjects with lower interoceptive sensitivity.
Moreover, interoception seems to be related to the experienced
emotion as reported in the context of everyday life [29].
Consistently, neuroimaging research shows an extensive overlap
among the neural substrates underlying interoceptive, emotional
and empathic experiences [17,19,26,30–38], suggesting shared
mechanisms for these processes. Brain areas most commonly
involved in this network are the insular cortex (IC), the anterior
cingulated cortex (ACC) and the somatosensory cortex [19,31,39–
42]. The posterior and middle IC are important for mapping
visceral states and the AIC integrates this visceral state with central
cognitive processing [41,43], allowing the physiological condition
of the body to gain conscious representation in the form of
subjective feelings [17–19,43]. Somatonsesory cortex has also been
described as a complementary interoceptive pathway [39,40], and
several studies support its role in pain empathy processing [44–46],
cognitive empathy [47–50] emotion perception and recognition
[51,52], and understanding other’s bodily state [53,54].
Evidence of a possible relationship between DD symptoms and
interoception comes from fMRI studies in normal subjects
showing that the right posterior insula underpins the subjective
experience of body-ownership [55], and that the feeling of losing
movement control is associated with a decreased activation of this
region and an increased activation of the somatosensory cortex
[56]. Moreover, the somatosensory cortex has also been related to
the maintaining of an on-line representation of the body [55].
Lesions’ studies support the involvement of right posterior insula in
the sense of limb ownership and self-awareness of actions [57,58].
As mentioned above, the posterior insula and the somatosensory
cortex are considered nodal pathways of the visceral afferents.
Furthermore, these findings endorse the relationship between
interoception and the representation of the body state. In
consequence, if symptoms of disembodiment –similar to the ones
experimented by DD patients– are associated with impairments of
interoceptive awareness, it is possible that DD patients also present
deficits mapping body visceral information, which might lead to an
inadequate representation of their own body state. Moreover, the
role of interoception in DD garners further support if we consider
the presence of emotional symptoms in this disorder and the
established link among interoception, emotional awareness and
empathy.
Although some authors have suggested that deficits in inter-
oception might in part underlie the symptomatology of DD
[59,60], to our knowledge, no experimental study has assessed this
ability in DD patients utilizing both behavioral and neurobiolog-
ical measures (fMRI connectivity analysis). Furthermore, this is the
first study to assess visceral perception alongside with empathy
processing in DD based on the stated relationship between both
cognitive processes. Combining the two groups of literature
described, we hypothesized that DD symptoms may be related
to an impairment or altered system of interoception and that the
physiopathology of the syndrome might be associated with deficits
in the patients’ perception and integration of their own visceral
information, leading to an inadequate representation of their body
state and, in consequence, to alterations in the emotional and
empathic experience.
To examine this hypothesis, we performed an interoceptive
assessment in JM, a patient with the primary diagnosis of DD. His
severe anomalous body experiences and somatosensory distortions
(described in Materials and Methods) represented an excellent
opportunity to examine interoceptive awareness. In the study, we
included cognitive tests, empathy tasks, heartbeat tracking and
measures of functional connectivity derived from fMRI networks
in states of interoception compared to other attentional states.
The relevance of the present study lies in its evidence of
interoceptive deficits in a patient with DD utilizing both
behavioral and physiological measures. Additionally, we present
experimental data of the patient’s impaired empathy performance.
These results can contribute to the understanding of the neural
mechanisms and cognitive processes underpinning DD in the
context of the comprehension of brain-body interactions and the
emergence of self-awareness and emotional feelings.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
All participants signed an informed consent form before the
evaluation. The patient in this manuscript has given written
informed consent (as outlined in PLOS consent form) to publish
these case details. The studies were conducted in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the INECO’s ethics
committee.
Participants
Patient description. Patient JM is a 23-year-old male with a
primary diagnosis of DD. The diagnosis was established by an
expert in DD following the criteria of the revised fifth edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [3].
Additionally, JM scored over the established cut-off score (71) for
the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS). Co-morbidity with
anxiety disorders was assessed by means of the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-IV axis I disorders [61]. Consistently with
clinical description of DD [62–65], the patient met criteria for
Social Anxiety and Generalized Anxiety Disorder.
His main complaints were his unremitting DD symptoms,
particularly those labeled as anomalous body experiences [66].
Additionally, his voice sounded distant and unfamiliar to him and
the experiential component of agency was lacking. [4].
He also presented somatosensory distortions, symptoms which
are common in Depersonalization-Derealization Disorder though
they are not restricted to DD. Sometimes he felt his hands were
changing their size, getting either larger or smaller, and that his
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body was floating or levitating. These experiences invariably
triggered a sense of losing control followed by distraction strategies
to lessen these symptoms (e.g., listening to music).
Control Sample. Two groups of controls were assessed. Five
healthy male controls that were matched for age and education
were recruited for the neuropsychological and clinical evaluations,
interoception assessment and resting fMRI scanning (interoception
assessment control, IAC). A second group of five healthy male
controls who were matched for age and education was evaluated
with a self-reported questionnaire of interpersonal reactivity and
an empathy experimental task (empathy assessment controls,
EAC).
Participants from both groups did not present a history of drug
abuse, neither of neurological or psychiatric conditions.
Assessment
Neuropsychological and clinical evaluation. Participants
from the IAC sample completed the Spanish version of the
Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS) [67], with the aim of
eliminating any subject who obtained scores near the cutoff of this
screening scale. Furthermore, we administered Beck’s Depression
Inventory [68] and the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) [69]
to evaluate mood and affective state, respectively. Finally, this
control group was evaluated with the INECO Frontal Screening
(IFS) [70]. The IFS assesses executive functions as an index of the
following subtasks: Motor Programming, Conflicting Instructions,
Verbal Inhibitory Control, Abstraction, Backwards Digit Span,
Spatial Working Memory, and Go/No Go.
Interoceptive behavioral measure: Heartbeat Detection
Task (HBD). We performed a motor tracking interoception
test, the Heartbeat Detection Task (HBD), which has already been
validated and applied in previous studies of our group [40,71]. In
the HBD participants are required to tap a computer keyboard
along with their heartbeat in different conditions. This motor
tracking task was selected based on its differences, and advantages
for our research, when compared to traditional interoceptive
sensitivity paradigms. The heartbeat discrimination task [72]
involves a possible interference factor [73] introduced by the
nature of the instructions that request participants to attend both
their endogenous heartbeat sensations and auditory or visual cues.
Regarding the other traditional interoceptive paradigm, mental
tracking [24], the HBD has the advantage of measuring correct
and incorrect answers and to evaluate participants performance
after an auditory feedback.
During the HBD the ECG signal was recorded with an ad-hoc
circuit composed of an amplifier AD620 and a band-pass filter
(low 0.05 Hz, high 40 Hz) and then analogically fed to a laptop
computer’s audio card. Three Ag/Ag-Cl adhesive electrodes were
placed to every subject in lead-II positions together with
headphones for audio stimuli delivery. The signal was processed
on-line with a PsychToolbox [74] script, running on Matlab
platform (MathWorks). External electrodes were used in the ECG
setup to collect the ECG signal, which was processed in real time
for peak detection and audio stimulation following the heartbeats.
This experimental task began with the assessment of two control
conditions of motor response skills. In the first condition,
participants were instructed to follow an audio recording of a
sampled heartbeat that presented a constant frequency of beats
(60 bpm). In the second one, they had to follow a recorded audio
that was previously manipulated to have a variable and inconstant
frequency. Next, they were told to follow their heartbeat two times
with no external stimulation or feedback (first and second
interoceptive condition). Then, they were given the same
instructions along with simultaneous auditory feedback of their
heart provided through online ECG register (feedback condition).
Finally, they were once again told to follow their heartbeat without
any feedback, and this instruction was also repeated twice (third
and fourth interoceptive condition).
Using a measure of accuracy response, we compared partici-
pants’ performance across the conditions to determine whether
they were following or not their heartbeats sensations (see Data
processing and analysis below).
Body mass-index. Previous studies reported that interocep-
tion performance may depend on the body mass index (BMI) [75].
To control the possible biases of this bodily difference, we
measured the BMI in all participants.
Interoceptive fMRI scanning: acquisition
Functional images were acquired on a Phillips Intera 1.5T with
a conventional head coil. Thirty-three axial slices (5 mm thick)
were acquired parallel to the plane connecting the anterior and
posterior commissures and covering the whole brain
(TR=2777 ms, TE= 35 ms, flip angle = 90).
JM and the IAC sample were scanned under three resting state
conditions that lasted ten minutes each: exteroception, mind
wandering and interoception. The instructions of the first
condition requested participants to focus on the sequence of
sounds generated by the noise of the scanner and to silently count
them. The goal of this instruction was to manipulate their
attention to focus it directly on the exogenous stimulus. In the next
condition, the mind wandering or proper resting state condition,
subjects were told to think about what they had done that day
since waking or what they were going to do for the rest of the day.
Finally, in the interoceptive condition participants were instructed
to focus on their respiration cycle and on their heartbeats. In all
three conditions, subjects were told to keep their eyes closed and to
avoid moving and falling asleep.
Empathy Tasks
Self-report questionnaire: Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI). The patient and subjects from the EAC group completed
the interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) [76], a 28-item self-
reported questionnaire that measures both the cognitive and
affective components of empathy. This scale comprises four
subscales: 1) Fantasy (F), assesses the extent to which participants
identify themselves with fictional characters; 2) Perspective Taking
(PT), evaluates the extent to which individuals try to adopt
another’s point of view; Empathic Concern (EC), measures the
feelings of warmth, compassion and concern for others; Personal
Distress (PD), assesses the feelings of anxiety and discomfort when
faced with a negative experience from another individual.
Empathy for pain (EPT). This task evaluates empathy in the
context of intentional and accidental harm [40,77–80]. In this test,
24 animated situations are shown to the participants (see Video
S1). Each situation depicts one of three kinds of interactions
between two people: a situation where one person intentionally
hurts (active performer) another person (passive performer), e.g.,
someone hits a person with a bat on the stomach on purpose
(intentional pain situation); another kind of situation where a
person hurts another one by accident (accidental pain situation),
e.g., a person goes backwards with his bike and accidentally hurts
someone else; and a third type of interaction where two people
interact in a neutral connotation situation (control situation), e.g.
one person gives a book to another one [80].
Following the video, the participants are asked to press a button
as soon as they have understood the situation and then they are
asked to answer seven questions: (1) Was the action done on
purpose? [evaluating cognitive aspects of empathy (intentionality);
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answered selecting Yes/No]; (2) How sad do you feel for the hurt
person? [evaluating affective aspects of empathy (empathic
concern)]; (3) How upset do you feel for what happened in the
situation? (evaluating discomfort towards the situation); (4) How
bad person the perpetrator is? [evaluating the intention of the
perpetrator to hurt the victim (harmful behavior)]; (5) How happy
do you feel for the person that committed the action? (evaluating
the valence towards the behavior); (6) How inappropriate was the
action? (evaluating correctness of the action) and (7) How much
penalty would you impose on the perpetrator? (evaluating the
moral aspects of empathy and punishment). Questions two to
seven were answered using a computer–based visual analogue
scale (VAS) that rates from -9 to 9 (see Video S1). The meaning of
the scale extremes depends on the question, for example on the
question ‘‘how sad do you feel for the hurt person?’’ one extreme
of the bar reads ‘‘I feel very sad’’ and the other extreme reads ‘‘I
don’t feel sad at all’’. Accuracy and RT were measured for the first
question, and ratings (empathy-related judgments) and RT for questions
two to seven were measured. The RT measured the time that
passed from the moment the question appeared, to the time the
participant answered. There was no pre-determined interstimulus
interval as each stimulus would start as soon as the participants
had answered the last question of the previous item. Before testing,
all participants performed a trial session with a similar situation in
order to ensure the correct understanding of the instructions.
Data processing and analysis
Heartbeat Detection Task (HBD). To assess performance
on the HBD, we used an index that normalizes the subjects correct
responses based on the total amount of heartbeats (Accuracy
Index). This index allows us to compare participants without the
bias of heart rate differences. We utilized a modified equation from
the one proposed by Schandry for his heartbeat mental tracking
method [24]. Schandry employs the total amount of mental
heartbeats counted and the total number of heartbeats recorded as
measures for his index.
Our motor tracking method allows us to discriminate the
correct motor response of the participants from their incorrect
answers. To separate them, every motor response was compared
within a specific time window around every recorded heartbeat; if
the tapping input was temporally located within the corresponding
time window for each beat, the response was considered as correct
(the time window is determined by the subjects’ heart rate:
between 0.125 milliseconds before and 0.750 milliseconds after the
beat, for a heart frequency less than 69.76; between 0.1
milliseconds before and 0.6 after, for frequencies between 69.75
and 94.25; and 0.075 milliseconds before and 0.4 milliseconds
after, for frequencies higher than 94.25). The total sum of all of the
subjects’ responses that fulfilled this temporal criterion was
considered as correct answers, and we used this more specific
measure of interoceptive performance instead of the total sum of
responses.





We calculated an Accuracy Index for every condition of the task
that can vary between 0 and 1 with high scores indicating smaller
differences between correct answers and recorder heartbeats.
FMRI preprocessing and graph theory analysis
Preprocessing. Functional data were preprocessed using
statistical parametric mapping software (SPM8; http://fil.ion.u-
cl.ac.uk/spm). EPI images from all sessions were slice-time
corrected and aligned to the first volume of the first session of
scanning to correct head movement between scans. Movement
parameters showed no movements greater than 3 mm or rotation
movements higher than 3 degrees of rotation [81]. T1-weighted
structural images were first co-registered to a mean image created
using the realigned volumes. Normalization parameters between
the co-registered T1 and the standard MNI T1 template were then
calculated, and applied to the anatomy and all EPI volumes. Data
were then smoothed using a 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum
isotropic Gaussian kernel to accommodate for inter-subject
differences in anatomy (these proceedings were followed according
to the pre-processing steps described in another paper of our
group: [82]).
Correlation matrices. First, based on a 116-Atlas [83],
mean time courses were extracted by averaging BOLD signal of all
the voxels contained in each of the 116 regions of interest (ROI).
These averages fMRI time series were then utilized to construct a
116-node functional connectivity (FC) network for each subject
and condition. Wavelet analysis was used to construct correlation
matrices from the time series [84]. We followed the same
procedures described by Supekar et al. [84] and employed in
other work from our group [82]. First, we applied a maximum
overlap discrete wavelet transform (MODWT) to each of the time
series to establish the contributing signal in the following three
frequency components: scale 1 (0.13 to 0.25 Hz), scale 2 (0.06 to
0.12 Hz), and scale 3 (0.01 to 0.05 Hz). Scale 3 frequencies lie in
the range of slow frequency correlations of the default network
[85,86], thus connectivity matrices based on this frequency were
utilized for all posterior analyses. Each ROI of these connectivity
matrices corresponds to a node, and the weights of the links
between ROIs were determined by the wavelets’ correlation at low
frequency from scale 3. These connectivity matrices describe time
frequency-dependent correlations, a measure of functional con-
nectivity between spatially distinct brain regions.
Graph theory metrics: Global Networks. To calculate
network measures from FC, we applied the same procedure used
in previously published works [82,87–89]. This methodology
involves converting the weighted functional matrices into binary
undirected ones by applying a threshold T on the correlation value
to determine the cutoff at which two ROIs are connected. We
used a broad range of threshold correlation values from 0.0005,
T,1, with increments of 0.001. The outputs of this procedure
were 1000 binary undirected networks for each one of the three
resting macro-states (exteroception, resting and interoception).
Then, the following network measures were calculated using the
BCT toolbox [90] for each binary undirected matrices: a) degree
(k), represents the number of connections that link one node to the
rest of the network [91]; b) the characteristic path length (L), is the
average of the minimum number of edges that must be crossed to
go from one node to any other node on the network and is taken as
a measure of functional integration [92]; c) average clustering
coefficient (C) indicates how strongly a network is locally
interconnected and is considered a measure of segregation [92]
and d) small-world (SW) that refers to an ubiquitous present
topological network which has a relatively short (compared to
random networks) characteristic path length (L) and high average
clustering coefficient (C) [92].
Instead of using the small-world (SW) measure from this
toolbox, which was proposed by Humphries and Gurney [93] and
involves the calculation of random networks, we combined
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integration (L) and segregation (C) metrics into a single formula to
calculate the small-worldness of the network [82]:
SW~C=L
This decision is based on Rubinov and Sporns’ [94] suggestion
that Humphries and Gurney’s SW measure may falsely report a
small-world topology in very poorly integrated networks. Thus, to
avoid biases from networks with these topological characteristics,
they recommend considering the individual assessment of
integration and segregation when characterizing functional
connectivity matrices, as we did with the SW formula employed.
For the statistical analysis of the 1000 binarized networks per
subject, we only used the range between the 50th network to the
800th (excluding the extreme values where network disaggregate)
and created 15 steps or bins based only in their metric values.
Each bin or step consisted in a given range comprising fifty
binarized matrices (e.g., setp or bin one 51–100; step two 101–150,
etc.) in which we calculated an average of all metrics measures.
The results of these procedures were 15 averaged metrics values
((800–50)/50)) per subject and per condition.
Graph theory metrics-Interoceptive-emotional
Network. To specifically compare brain areas related to
interoceptive and empathy processing, we analyzed the local
metrics of three regions of interest (ROIs): IC, ACC and
somatonsensory cortex. Therefore, instead of using all the 116
areas comprised in the Tzourio-Mazoyer anatomical atlas [83], we
selected these three anatomical areas bilaterally. Based on the
same procedure described above, we selected metrics that bring
information about the segregation of each ROI: a) local clustering
coefficient (lC), that quantifies the number of existing links
between the nearest neighbors of a node as a proportion of the
maximum number of possible links [92], and b) the local efficiency
(E), defined as the inverse shortest path length within the nearest
neighbors of the node in question [95]. We ran the same statistical
analysis procedure used for the global metrics analysis but for these
two metrics.
Network size. Creating binary and undirected matrices by
applying a threshold to determine the correlation cutoff of
connections among ROIs involves the generation of networks of
different sizes. For example, a particular threshold could
determine that a group of ROIs is connected in one weight
matrix and not in another. Accordingly, when these two matrices
are binarized using this threshold, they will present a different
amount of ROIs connected among each other. Different
functional network sizes using this method depend on the ROIs’
correlation strengths for each individual subjects, and this might
bias the network characterization when graph metrics are
calculated. To control this bias, we also applied another process
to generate binary and undirected matrices. Instead of establishing
a particular threshold for brain correlations, we used the number
of links (ROIs connected) in the weighted network as a cut-off to
create each undirected graph. We utilized a broad range of
connection values ranging from networks with one connection up
to networks that were fully connected, with increments of 6728
connections to create 1000 undirected graphs. As we did in the
previous processes for the statistical analysis, we used a broad
range of connection values, from 50 to 800 connections, in steps of
50 (excluding the extreme values where networks disaggregate).
All our data analysis (neuropsychological and clinical evalua-
tions, interoceptive behavioral measure, fMRI resting-state images
and empathy for pain results) are available upon request.
Statistical analysis
To compare the patients’ performances with both control
samples, we used a modified one-tailed t-test [96–99]. This
methodology allows the assessment of significance by comparing
multiple individual’s test scores with norms derived from small
samples. Although parametric statistics usually requires compar-
ison groups of about 30 subjects, the one-tailed t-test allows the
assessment of significance by comparing an individual’s score to
the scores obtained in a small control sample (even less than 5
subjects) [99]. This modified test is more robust for non-normal
distributions, presents low values of type I error, and has already
been reported in recent single case studies [40,100,101]. Addi-
tionally, this statistical method has already been employed in an
early investigation that compared the connectivity indices of fMRI
during resting states between a small control sample and a single
case [102].
Procedure
Patient JM was first evaluated via a psychiatric examination by
an expert on Depersonalization-Derealization disorder and
anxiety disorders (R.K). Next, JM and each participant from the
IAC sample were assessed with the HBD task during individual
sessions. All of the evaluations took place in a noise-free and
comfortable environment. Additionally, in the same session, we
administered the neuropsychological test (IFS) and the self-report
questionnaires (BDI, STAI and CDS). In another session, JM and
participants from this group underwent fMRI scanning. In the
second step of the study, the patient and the second control group,
EAC, were evaluated using empathy tasks (IRI and EPT) in
individual sessions.
Results
Sociodemographic, clinical and neuropsychological
results
Sociodemographic, clinical and neuropsychological results of
JM and the IAC sample are provided in Table 1. No significant
differences in age (t =21.52, p = 0.1, Zcc =21.67), years of formal
education (t =20.76, p = 0.24, Zcc =20.84) and gender (they
were all males) were found between JM and the IAC group. No
patient-control differences were observed in either the neuropsy-
chological EF evaluation (IFS) (t =21.56, p = 0.09, Zcc =21.70),
depression (t = 0.91, p = 0.21, Zcc = 0.99) and anxiety state and
trait (STAI-S, t = 1.26, p= 0.14, Zcc = 1.38; STAI-T, t = 0.87,
p = 0.21, Zcc = 0.96).
Cambridge Depersonalization Scale
JM showed significant differences from the IAC group in almost
all of the subscales of the CDS that measure the intensity of the
subjective experience of depersonalization symptoms (memories
recall, t = 4.76, p,0.01, Zcc = 5.21; alienation, t = 5.40, p,0.01,
Zcc = 5.91; body experience, t = 5.39, p,0.01, Zcc = 5.92), except
for emotional numbing (t = 0.79, p = 0.24, Zcc = 0.87). Addition-
ally, JM presented significantly higher scores compared to controls
in the subscales of the CDS that assess frequency (t = 7.41, p,
0.01, Zcc = 8.13) and duration (t = 7.11, p,0.01, Zcc = 7.78) of
depersonalization-derealization episodes. Finally, significant dif-
ferences were found between the patient and controls in the total
score (t = 7.36, p,0.01, Zcc = 8.06) (see also Fig. 1).
Interoceptive results
Heartbeat Detection Task (HBD). No significant differ-
ences were found between the patient and the IAC sample in the
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first two motor-auditory conditions (first motor-auditory t = 0.62,
p = 0.28, Zcc = 0.68; second motor-auditory t =21.25, p = 0.14,
Zcc =21.37). In these conditions, participants were told to follow
recorded heartbeats. Similar results were obtained when compar-
ing the patient’s and controls’ performance in the first interocep-
tive condition (t =21.50, p = 0.10, Zcc =21.65). However,
controls showed a significantly higher Accuracy Index than the
patient in the second interoceptive condition (t = 0.49, p,0.01,
Zcc =25). In these conditions, participants were told to follow
their own heartbeats without any auditory cue. In the following
condition, where subjects listen online to their own heartbeats
through headphones, both groups presented similar results (t = 0,
p = 0.50, Zcc = 0). Finally, significant differences were found in the
last interoceptive conditions; as in the second interoceptive
condition, controls exhibited a higher Accuracy Index than the
patient (third interoceptive condition, t =23.15, p = 0.02, Zcc =2
3.45; fourth interoceptive condition t =23.96, p,0.01, Zcc =2
4.33). In these, subjects were requested to concentrate on their
physical sensations again and to follow their own heartbeats
without any cue (see also Fig. 2).
In summary, JM exhibited a deficit performance, compared to
IAC sample, in almost all interoceptive conditions, and both
groups only showed similar results in conditions that involved
following some auditory cue (first and second motor-auditory
condition as well as feedback conditions).
Body Mass Index. No significant differences in body masss
index (BMI) were found between the patient and this control
sample (t = 0.78, p = 0.24, Zcc = 0.85).
Interoceptive Functional Connectivity (FC) Results
The small size of the IAC group represents one possible
limitation of the fMRI analysis. To test whether the five subjects of
this group could be used as a representative control sample, we
compared their mind-wandering FC with that from 23 normal
Table 1. Demographic, clinical and neuropsychological assessment.
JM T p Zcc IAC Simple
Sociodemographic data
Age 23 21.52 0.1 21.67 M= 28.2; SD = 3.11 (25–33)
Formal education (in years) 16 20.76 0.24 20.84 M= 17.4; SD = 1.67 (15–19)
IFS
Total Store 23/30 21.56 0.09 21.70 M= 27; SD= 2.34 (25–30)
Affective screening
Depression (BDI) 8 0.91 0.21 0.99 M= 2.8; SD = 5.21 (0–12)
Anxiety State (STAI-S) 28 1.26 0.14 1.38 M= 26.2; SD = 1.30 (25–28)
Anxiety Trait (STAI-T) 39 0.87 0.21 0.96 M= 30.2; SD = 9.20 (22–46)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098769.t001
Figure 1. Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS). Subscales and Total Raw Scores. Higher scores in the first four subscales represent a
higher presence of experiences from each of the DD main symptoms (all significant, except for Emotional Numbing). Frequency and duration refer to
all DD symptoms. Total score is a product of the sum of the measures, and its established score cut off is 70. * expressed significant differences between
DD patient and control sample.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098769.g001
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subjects (age, gender, and handedness matched) extracted from the
1000 Functional Connectomes Project [103], an open-access
repository of resting-state functional MRI datasets (http://
fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/). The results showed no differences
between the IAC sample and controls from the connectomes
project, suggesting that our sample group might be representative
of a more general healthy population (see Information S1 for
details of these analyses and Figure S1 for results).
Comparing network connectivity matrices
Functional connectivity matrices describe the relationship
between brain regions that are anatomically separated but
functionally linked during resting states. From the vast amount
of spontaneous brain activity arise different networks that
comprise groups of brain regions that are highly correlated with
each other [104–106]. These networks are usually referred to as
resting-state networks (see [107] for a review of this networks).
Fig. 3 illustrates the most often reported resting-state networks
including the default mode network (consisting of the precuneus,
medial frontal and inferior parietal and temporal regions), the
cingulo-opercular network (temporal/insular and anterior cingu-
late cortex regions), the occipital or visual network, the fronto-
parietal network (superior parietal and superior frontal regions),
the primary sensorimotor network, the basal ganglia and the
cerebellum [108–114].
These standard resting-state networks are labeled in our
functional brain connectivity matrices (see Fig. 4). Thus, for each
connectivity matrix (exteroception, interoception and mind-
wandering), we conducted a modified one-tailed t-test for each
entry of the matrix comparing the patient and the IAC (see Fig. 4).
A positive t-value indicates increased connectivity in the patient
compared to the IAC sample. Conversely, a negative t-value
indicated a greater connectivity in controls than in the patient.
The distribution of absolute t-values is shown in the Fig. 4,
which visualizes an unsigned estimate of change across groups for
each cognitive state. To test the connectivity between JM and
controls in these distributions of t-value matrices, we performed a
one-sample t-test. Our null hypothesis was that the distribution
matrices came from a distribution with mean zero, which would
indicate no difference in the connectivity between groups being
compared across the three cognitive states. The results of this t-test
rejected the null hypothesis in the three states. Negative t values
found in exteroceptive (mean =20.48, std = 1.38, t =240.74,
CImin =25.08, CImax =20.46) and interoceptive condition
(mean =20.73, std = 1.37, t =261.60, CImin =20.75, CImax
=20.70) suggests that JM presented a strong decreased connec-
tivity pattern compared to controls. Contrarily in the resting
condition, positive t-values reflect an increased connectivity in JM
compared to controls (mean =0.19, std = 0.89, t = 25.22, CImin
= 0.18, CImax = 0.21).
These results show relevant differences in the large-scale brain
functional organization across different cognitive/attentional states
between JM and the control group. Despite of the fact that these
outcomes are presented across the three resting-states, t-values
suggest that mean connectivity differences among brain areas
might be more pronounced in the interoceptive condition.
Graph theory metrics: Global Networks
No significant differences in any network measures were found
between the patient and the IAC group throughout the 15 steps in
either the mind-wandering or the exteroceptive macro-states.
However, a comparison between groups in the interoceptive
condition revealed that JM has a higher characteristic path length
(L) than controls in all of the steps (presenting significant
differences in the last four: 12, t = 2.47, p = 0.03, Zcc = 2.70; 13,
t = 2.88, p= 0.02, Zcc = 3.15; 14, t = 3.70, p = 0.01, Zcc = 4.05; 15,
t = 2.85, p= 0.02, Zcc = 3.12). The patient also showed a decreased
Figure 2. Heartbeat Detection Task (HBD). The Accuracy Index can vary between 0 and 1, with higher scores indicating better interoceptive
sensitivity. * indicates significant differences between JM and the control sample.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098769.g002
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Figure 3. Resting-state networks. Most-often reported networks in previous research that contain groups of brain regions highly correlated with
each other.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098769.g003
Figure 4. Networks connectivity matrices. (A) Averaged correlation matrices for JM, control sample and conditions. Bottom rows shows t-values
for test-t between JM and the control group. (B) T-value distributions for JM (red) and the IAC sample (blue).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098769.g004
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average clustering coefficient (C) compared to controls, although
only trend differences were found in the last four steps and just one
significant result in the last one (11, t =21.81, p = 0.07, Zcc =2
1.98; 12, t =21.97, p = 0.06, Zcc =22.164; 13, t =21.99,
p = 0.06, Zcc =22.19; 14, t =21.64, p= 0.08, Zcc =21.79; 15,
t =22.46, p = 0.03, Zcc =22.70) (see Fig. 5).
Regarding the small-world (SW), no significant differences were
found between JM and controls throughout the three cognitive
states, however controls presented a trend toward higher SW
organization in the interoception condition in the last four steps
(12, t =21.73, p = 0.08, Zcc =21.89; 13, t =21.77, p = 0.07,
Zcc =21.95; 14, t =21.71, p= 0.08, Zcc =21.87; 15, t =21.99,
p = 0.06, Zcc =22.19) (see Fig. 5). Fig. 5 shows that this trend was
only found in this cognitive state and not in the others
(exteroception and resting), where the SW organization between
groups was similar.
Finally, the degree (K) did not evidence differences in any of the
conditions.
Graph theory metrics: Local Networks
In this analysis we compared the local metric of ROIs from the
interoceptive-emotional network previously defined: IC, ACC and
somatonsesory cortex. No metrics differences were found in this
network in the mind-wandering macro-state neither in the
exteroceptive condition (see Figure S2 and Figure S3 for results).
Regarding the interoceptive condition, the patient exhibited
similar metrics results to the ones found in the graph analysis of
the global network. During this last attentional macro-state, we
found a decreased local clustering coefficient (lC) and local
efficiency (E) in JM’s network topology compared to controls. This
pattern of decreased segregation metrics was presented in all the
ROIs (differences were mostly in the last steps of the analysis): IC,
ACC and somatonsensory cortex (see Fig. 6 and Information S2
for detailed results).
FC controlling by the network’s sizes
Given that we created a serial of networks with similar node
size, no differences were found in the degree (K) of any of them in
any condition. The K of a ROI represents the number of
connections that link it to the rest of the network [91]. Indeed, this
network measure is the criterion we utilized to create the
undirected graphs during this process; this is why no differences
were found.
Additionally, a similar event occurred with the characteristic
path length (L) of these networks that showed no significant
differences between groups. L, which is defined as the average of
the minimum number of ROIs that must be traversed to go from
one ROI to all the others in the network [91], is highly influenced
by K values. The distance that separates ROIs depends on the
number of network connections. If more areas are connected
within the network, smaller is the distance to travel from one ROI
to all the others. Thus, if we compared networks that present the
same number of connections, then the average distance that
separates one ROI from the others might be similar. In this way,
this might explain why we did not find differences in L when
comparing JM with controls in any of the cognitive states.
In conclusion, no differences were found neither in K or L when
the size of networks was controlled. Additionally, both the patient
and controls presented similar results in the remaining graph
metrics (C and SW) during the exteroception and resting states.
However, controls showed a significantly higher C than JM
(relevant results in most of the steps: 2, t =22.63, p = 0.03,
Zcc =22.89; 3, t =23.06, p = 0.02, Zcc =23.36; 4, t =23.91, p,
0.01, Zcc =24.30; 5, t =22.71, p = 0.03, Zcc =22.97; 6, t =2
2.55, p= 0.03, Zcc =22.81; 7, t =22.34, p= 0.04, Zcc =22.56; 8,
t =22.12, p = 0.05, Zcc =22.32; 9, t =22.02, p= 0.06, Zcc =2
2.22) and also an increased SW measure (trend differences in three
steps: 9, t =22.01, p = 0.06, Zcc =22.21; 10, t =21.76, p = 0.08,
Zcc =21.92; 11, t =22.02, p = 0.08, Zcc =21.92; and significant
differences in one: 12, t =22.29, p = 0.04, Zcc =22.51) during the
interoception condition.
To summarize, after applying the correlation threshold proce-
dure, JM presented a significantly higher characteristic path length
(L) than controls, and trended toward a lower average clustering
coefficient (C) and lower Small World (SW) only during the
interoceptive condition. The patient also showed a significant
decreased clustering coefficient (lC) and local efficiency (E) in the
analysis of the interoceptive-emotional network (IC, ACC and
somatosensory cortex) during interoceptive macro-state exclusive-
ly.
Metrics results from the correlation threshold procedure are
consistent with those found in networks of similar sizes (where the
number of connections was used instead of correlation thresholds
to control and normalize networks size). In this control procedure,
JM also exhibited trends of lower C and SW exclusively during the
interoceptive condition, suggesting that differences in the large
brain scale organization between the patient and the IAC sample
are not biased by different networks size [81].
Empathy Tasks Results
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). JM scored lower on
the PT subscale (Perspective Taking, t =23.17, p= 0.02, Zcc =2
3.48) and on the EC subscale (Empathic Concern, t =23.23,
p = 0.01, Zcc =23.45) than the EAC sample. No significant
differences were found in the PD (Personal Distress, t = 1.22,
p = 0.14, Zcc = 1.34) and F (Fantasy, t =20.31, p = 0.38, Zcc =2
0.34) subscales between groups (see also Fig. 7).
Empathy for pain (EPT)
JM showed some patterns of impairments in EPT associated
with the recognition of neutral and intentional conditions
compared to the EAC sample. In the first condition, he presented
deficits in the recognition of action intentionality (t=260.87, p,
0.01, Zcc=266.67), significantly lower RTs in harmful behavior
(t=2.59; p=0.03; Zcc=2.84), lower empathy-related judgments in
valence behavior (t=22.72; p=0.02; Zcc=22.98) and higher
empathy-related judgments in empathic concern (t=3.44;
p=0.01; Zcc=3.77), discomfort (t=20.04; p,0.01; Zcc=22.24)
and correctness (t=2,84; p=0.02; Zcc=3.11). In the second
condition, he simply exhibited lower empathy-related judgments
in empathic concern (t=24.18; p,0.01; Zcc=24.59) and
discomfort (t=24,02; p,0.01; Zcc=24.40) (see also Fig. 8 and
Information S3 for a table with detailed description of results).
Discussion
The goal of this study was to assess interoception in a patient
with chronic DD. The main finding was that the patient presented
deficits on the cognitive processing of body signals both in a
behavioral interoceptive task and during an fMRI interoceptive
macro-state. In addition, to test the link between interoception,
empathy and DD, we utilized empathic tasks, where JM showed
an impaired performance based on his inadequate empathic
responses to scenes depicting neutral and harmful situations.
This is the first experimental research that directly assessed the
link among DD symptoms, empathy and interoception combining
behavioral and neurobiological measures. The results of intero-
ceptive deficits in JM may contribute to the understanding of
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cognitive processes and neural underpinnings of DD. Together
with empathic results, they become a source of evidence for the
comprehension of emotion-interoception interactions and for the
emergence of self-awareness and emotional feelings.
Interoception and DD
JM experienced a high intensity of symptoms regarding body
disengagement, as shown by both the CDS results and by his own
clinical complaints. Based on this phenomenology and on the
relationship between self-awareness and interoception, we pro-
posed the hypothesis of interoceptive deficits in JM, which was
then supported by results in the HBD task and in the functional
connectivity analyses.
The HBD is a measure of interoception: higher accuracy scores
on this task are associated with better interoceptive sensitivity.
Compared to controls, JM presented a worse performance in
conditions involving the detection of one’s endogenous heartbeat,
without external cues. This behavioral evidence sustains our
hypothesis about interoceptive sensitivity impairments in the
patient.
In the same vein as the behavioral measures, functional
connectivity analyses of interoceptive macro-states showed a
consistent trend of lower global brain connectivity of JM
compared to controls. These results were supported by the
analyses of the connectivity between brain areas in each macro-
state and by its characterization using graph theory metrics. In the
former, network connectivity matrices showed that the highest
differences between JM and control sample among resting-state
conditions were presented in the interoceptive one, where the
patient exhibited a less connected network compared to controls.
Despite that these matrices analysis presented differences across
all cognitive states between groups, exclusively during the
interoceptive state, JM’s brain connectivity network revealed
sub-optimal metrics: higher characteristic path length (L), lower
average clustering coefficient (C) and lower small-world (SW). A
SW organization is an important feature of brain network
complexity that reflects an optimal balance of a high level of
segregation (C) with a high level of global integration (L) [115].
Metrics results showed that DD patient exhibited lower levels of
segregation (C) than controls which might imply an altered
Figure 5. Global Graph Theory Analysis. Columns indicate each resting-state condition, and rows indicate each graph metric. The Y-axis shows
raw metric scores, and the X-axis shows the range of thresholds, from 50 to 800, in steps of 50 (excluding extreme values where networks
disaggregate). Boxes indicate significant and trend differences between JM and the control sample. Blue shadows represent controls’ standard deviation
area.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098769.g005
Interoception and Emotion in DD
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e98769
Figure 6. Local Graph Theory Analysis 2 Interoceptive macro-state. Columns indicate each ROI from the interoceptive-emotional network,
and rows indicate each graph metric. The Y-axis shows raw metric scores, and the X-axis shows the range of thresholds, from 50 to 800, in steps of 50
(excluding extreme values where networks disaggregate). Boxes indicate significant and trend differences between JM and the control sample. Blue
shadows represent controls’ standard deviation area.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098769.g006
Figure 7. Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). Subscales raw scores. * indicates significant differences between the DD patient and the control
sample.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098769.g007
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efficiency in local information transfer and processing. Addition-
ally, the higher characteristic path length (L) of the patient might
indicate impairments of network functional integration that refers
to the combination of specialized information rapidly from
distributed long-range connections. This disruption of global and
local functional networks in the patient compared to controls
suggests a loss of efficiency in information exchange between both
regional and distributed brain areas and, therefore, an altered
global topological organization of brain network only during
interoceptive macro-state.
In order to analyze the brain connectivity within areas
specifically involved in interoceptive and emotional processing,
we compared metrics of segregation of the IC, ACC and the
somatosensorial cortex between the patient and normal subjects.
As we found in the global assess of functional networks, JM
presented lower levels of segregation (local clustering coefficient,
lC, and local efficiency, E) in these ROIs only during the
interoceptive macro-state. These results highlight the possible
impairment in local processing of interoceptive information within
this network. The relevance of the disruption of these interocep-
tive-emotional ROIs is based on the fact that group’s differences
were found only when participants were requested to focus
attention on their cardiac and breathing sensations, and not when
they attended to external sounds or they thought about their daily
routine. In consequence, these connectivity deficits in global
patterns and in key interoceptive ROIs, during the attention to the
endogenous stimuli of heart and breathing, might indicate an
ineffective system for the integration and processing of interocep-
tive information.
In light of previous neuronanatomical findings, the association
found in this patient between interoceptive deficits 2in our
behavioral and neurobiological measures2 and disembodiment
symptoms garners further support. Neuroimaging studies have
shown that better performance in the HBD task engaged higher
activation of the right AIC and the ACC [19,23]. The right AIC
area is critical for self-awareness [41,43]: it integrates the flow of
interoceptive information from the posterior and middle parts of
the IC with central cognitive processing, allowing the physiological
condition of the body to obtain conscious representation in the
form of subjective feelings [17,18,30]. Consequently, worse
interoception sensitivity might be associated with decreased
activation of IC. Additionally, a lesion study [39] highlighted the
role of the somatonsensory cortex as part of another interoceptive
pathway involving skin afferents projections. A patient with
complete bilateral IC and ACC damage, but intact bilateral
primary somatonsesory cortex, demonstrated interoceptive aware-
ness comparable to healthy controls. However, when a topical
lidocaine anesthetic was applied to the skin covering the region of
maximal heartbeat sensation, only control participants presented
changes in interoceptive awareness. As a result, authors proposed
the existence of two interoceptive awareness pathways: one
compressing visceral afferents projections to the insula and the
Figure 8. Empathy for pain task (EPT). Neutral condition results: (A) categorization accuracy in percent; (B) reaction time in seconds of Harmful
behavior and (C) average pain rating scores for each question after scenes of the neutral condition. Intentional condition results: (D) average
empathy-related judgments scores for each question after scenes of this condition. * expressed significant differences between the DD patient and
control sample.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098769.g008
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other involving skin afferents projections to somatosensory cortex
[39].
The plausibility of this relationship between these interocceptive
hubs and DD disembodiment symptoms is further suggested by
recent studies that have shown that the subjective experience of
body-awareness is associated with the IC and somatosensory
cortex [55–58]. In consequence, our findings about connectivity
deficits in the IC, ACC and somatonsesory cortex during the
interoceptive macro state, together with their role in interoceptive
and body awareness, suggest the possible involvement of this brain
network as a neural substrate for DD.
In summary, behavioral and neurobiological data support our
prediction of interoceptive awareness impairments in JM. This
deficit would lead to alterations in the process whereby the visceral
body state gains conscious representation in the form of self-
awareness and emotional feelings. In this way, it may be possible
that DD disembodiment symptoms are partly associated with
alterations in interoceptive mechanisms. Moreover, IC, ACC and
somatosensory cortex, which are engaged in interoception and
self-awareness, may be considered as a neural substrate of DD
[11,59].
Relevance for state-of-the-art models of DD and
interoception
The possible role of interoception in DD can be linked with the
two-network neurobiological model of DD [4]. First, an abnormal
prefrontal regulation of the AIC [4] is considered to be responsible
for emotional numbing symptoms. Second, based on phenome-
nological overlaps between symptoms of brain-injured patients
and DD, it is suggested that disrupted parietal functioning would
account for disembodiment in DD [116]. Furthermore, as we have
already mentioned, the same neural systems are revealed as two
independent pathways related to interoception: one involving an
AIC-ACC network and the other implicating parietal regions (S1
and S2) [39]. The confrontation of anatomical areas involved in
each of these models highlights the possible association between
interoception2and its underlying brain network comprised by IC,
ACC and somatosensory cortex2 and DD symptoms. Addition-
ally, an interoceptive model of conscious presence [59] directly
proposed that DD symptoms might be related to imprecise body
signal predictions. Our findings provide experimental evidence for
this model proposal about the interoceptive deficits in DD
patients.
Empathy and DD
Although JM’s main clinical complaints did not include
abnormalities in his emotional experiences, and no differences
were found in the CDS emotional numbing subscale, he presented
impairments in the experimental assessment (EPT) of affective
empathy. In first place, he failed to recognize the intentionality of
neutral acts when compared to controls. This difference might be
due to the fact that neutral scenes are less salient and more
ambiguous than accidental and, especially, intentional ones [78].
Thus, lack of stimuli salience [26] in this condition may have
represented an obstacle for the patient to elucidate the intention of
actors in the scene and, consequently, could have induced his
altered pattern of empathy-related judgments (see Fig. 8). On the
other hand, the most interesting results of this task correspond to
patient’s performance during the intentional condition, where
stimuli depicted people that are harmful intentionally in violent
ways. When asked about his empathic 2‘‘gut feeling’’2 reactions
against what happened in these scenes, he experienced signifi-
cantly less empathic concern (sadness) and discomfort for victims
of intentional harm. In the same line, JM reported difficulties in his
capacity to feel compassion for others (IRI sub-scale: Empathic
Concern, EC). These last results highlight, despite the absence of
complains about emotional numbing, that the patient might
present deficits in the affective component of empathy.
Embodied views of affective empathy [11,117–119] state that a
principal component of empathy relies on the generation,
representation and perception of one’s own feeling state. Evidence
for the relationship between affective empathy and feeling states
comes from studies showing a neural overlap between both
cognitive processes, mainly involving the IC [120–123]. If the
understanding of others’ experience is to some extent related to the
perception of one’s own internal state [124–126], then disruptions
in the processing of one’s own feelings may have an impact on
empathic response. Given this situation, DD patients with
emotional numbing should present empathic impairments, as
proven by DD studies that found a patients’ diminished emotional
reaction to other’s feelings [11] and impairments in implicit
measures of empathic abilities [10].
Our findings about JM’s less empathic response are consistent
with these reports and, to our knowledge, are the first data from an
experimental design (EPT) that directly assessed the empathic
response to highly affective scenes. However, the experimental
results did not seem to be related to JM’s complaints given that he
did not express any clinical difficulties in his emotional sphere.
One possible explanation for this lack of clear emotional numbing
symptoms, along with the presence of experimental deficits in
empathic experiences, could be related to his disembodiment
symptoms. Extreme feelings of anomalous body sensations could
have minimized the presence of emotional difficulties during
clinical assessment.
Related to the cognitive dimension of empathy, the results from
the IRI suggest that JM presented deficits in adopting others’ point
of view. This finding differs from the DD literature where
unimpaired performances of patients have been reported in
cognitive empathy [11]. One possible explanation of this
divergence is that former studies utilized traditional tasks without
any social context (e.g., the ‘‘reading the mind in the eyes, [127]),
instead, the IRI sub-scale evaluates the skill to take the outer
perspective in ‘‘real life’’ situations [128]. Difficulties in this task
are expected, as previous findings in DD reported deficits in
empathic skills within social situations [10]. Consequently, DD
patients might present spared cognitive empathy when social
context is not involved and deficits in tasks consisting of social
situations that introduce more complex scenarios (where it is
harder to disentangle the cognitive and affective components).
In sum, despite the fact that emotional numbing symptoms were
not clearly presented in the clinical assessment of JM, the
experimental evaluations found deficits in affective and cognitive
components of empathy. Embodied views of cognition, which state
the relationship between emotional feeling awareness and affective
empathy, along with the interoception-emotions interaction,
highlight the possible role of interoceptive deficits in empathy
impairments.
Interoception, empathy and DD
Interoceptive processing contributes to the basis of emotional
experience and feeling state. Within an embodied view of
empathy, interoception, as the representation of bodily internal
states linked with emotional experiences, could be involved in
processing the affective state of others. Recent findings sustain this
prediction [21], showing the modulation of cortical processing of
heartbeats by the affective judgment of facial stimuli. Furthermore,
an fMRI study showed the enhancement of empathy-related
activity in the bilateral IC, posterior to interoceptive awareness
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[129]. In the case of the somatosensory cortex, several studies
indicated its role in pain empathy processing (especially when
physical injuries are involved) [44–50,55] and in interoception
awareness [39]. Those results support the close association
between interoception and empathy, and provide evidence about
the impact of body signal processing in the experience and
manifestation of feelings for others. In the same vein, JM’s deficits
in interoception and empathy are consistent with this association
between the body and subjective emotional feelings, reflecting that
impairments in the perception and integration of visceral
information might lead to inadequate representation of feelings
states and to disruptions in affective empathic response. Moreover,
a recent fMRI research [60] that compared processing of facial
emotional expression between DD patients and controls showed a
relationship between alexithymia and brain areas related to
interoception, monitoring and reflection of internal states and
emotion. These findings support our experimental results about
interoceptive and emotional deficits in JM and highlight the
possible substantial role of interoceptive impairments in the
phenomenology of DD regarding body and emotional awareness.
Limitations and further directions
The current research presents several limitations that should be
accounted for in future studies. First, inferences are based on
evidence from a single case, which is not enough to completely
clarify the role of interoception and empathy in DD for which
future group studies shall be conducted. Moreover, the small
sample size of the control group and the presence of two different
control samples are issues that might bias our inferences about the
cognitive mechanism underlying DD phenomenology. To clarify
our proposal of interoceptive deficits as a key impaired process in
DD, it is necessary to utilize larger control groups in future
research. Additionally, our research only assessed empathy
experiences; future studies should also use tasks that evaluate a
broad range of emotional experiences to gain a deeper insight into
the interaction between interoception and emotions. Finally,
despite JM met criteria for Social Anxiety and Generalized
Anxiety Disorder 2according to the module F of the Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders2, the possible
interference of anxiety or depression levels was controlled, and
patient did not present differences in this affective domain
compare to controls. Furthermore, several studies have stated
that patients with DD often present high level of anxiety [62], of
which more common manifestations are social anxiety and panic
attacks [63–65]. Despite this association, a recent study suggest
that the relationship between anxiety and DD is non-significant in
patients with moderate to severe symptoms of DD [130].
Nevertheless, this is the first experimental report that combines
the assessment of interoception and affective empathy in a DD
patient with extreme disembodiment symptoms. In this way, we
provide direct evidence of the association between interoception
and DD phenomenology that should be further tested, represent-
ing an important step to better understand the neural mechanism
and substrates of this disabling condition.
Conclusions
DD is a syndrome characterized by a disruption of body self-
awareness. Our behavioral and neurobiological evidence of
impaired interoceptive awareness and affective empathy in JM
support the association between these affective-cognitive domains.
Alongside theoretical and empirical evidence from DD and body/
self-awareness research, these results highlight the possibility that
altered interoceptive processing is engaged on the basis of clinical
features, such as disembodiment and emotional numbing. In
consequence, body signal processing, which leads to conscious
representation of the self and of emotional states, would contribute
to the understanding of the cognitive mechanisms and neural
substrates underlying DD phenomenology.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Graph Theory Analysis of mind-wandering
resting-state. 1000 Functional Connectomes Project vs. IAC
sample (FC metrics). The Y-axis show raw metrics score and the
X-axis, the range of thresholds, from 50 to 800, in steps of 50.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Local Graph Theory Analysis 2 Mind wan-
dering macro-state. Columns indicate each ROI from the
interoceptive-emotional network, and rows indicate each graph
metric. The Y-axis shows raw metric scores, and the X-axis shows
the range of thresholds, from 50 to 800, in steps of 50 (excluding
extreme values where networks disaggregate). Boxes indicate
significant and trend differences between JM and the control sample. Blue
shadows represent controls’ standard deviation area.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Local Graph Theory Analysis 2 Exteroceptive
macro-state. Columns indicate each ROI from the interocep-
tive-emotional network, and rows indicate each graph metric. The
Y-axis shows raw metric scores, and the X-axis shows the range of
thresholds, from 50 to 800, in steps of 50 (excluding extreme values
where networks disaggregate). Boxes indicate significant and trend
differences between JM and the control sample. Blue shadows represent
controls’ standard deviation area.
(TIF)
Information S1 1000 Functional Connectomes Project’s
analysis and results. Description of the analysis and results of
the comparison between the control sample and the data from the
1000 Functional Connectome Project.
(DOC)
Information S2 Graph theory metrics: Local Networks
of Interoceptive Condition. Detailed results of graph analysis
of the IC, ACC and somatonsesory cortex during the interoceptive
condition.
(DOC)
Information S3 Empathy for Pain (EPT) Results. Table
with the complete results of this task.
(DOC)
Video S1 Examples of the Stimuli of the Empathy for
pain (EPT). Examples of intentional, accidental and neutral
conditions of the task.
(WMV)
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: BC AC PB TB AI. Performed
the experiments: LS BC MM AY MV. Analyzed the data: LS BC MM PB.
Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: AC PB MS TB. Wrote the
paper: LS BC AI. Contributed in collecting the data: RK Contributed
revising and writing the final version of the manuscript: SB SE RK PB MS
DC FM.
Interoception and Emotion in DD
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 14 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e98769
References
1. Lee WE, Kwok CH, Hunter EC, Richards M, David AS (2012) Prevalence and
childhood antecedents of depersonalization syndrome in a UK birth cohort.
Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 47: 253–261.
2. Hunter EC, Sierra M, David AS (2004) The epidemiology of depersonalisation
and derealisation. A systematic review. Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 39:
9–18.
3. Association AP (2013) Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders
(5th ed.): Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing.
4. Sierra M, David AS (2011) Depersonalization: a selective impairment of self-
awareness. Conscious Cogn 20: 99–108.
5. Phillips ML, Sierra M (2003) Depersonalization disorder: a functional
neuroanatomical perspective. Stress 6: 157–165.
6. Hunter EC, Phillips ML, Chalder T, Sierra M, David AS (2003)
Depersonalisation disorder: a cognitive-behavioural conceptualisation. Behav
Res Ther 41: 1451–1467.
7. Association AP (1994) Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders
(4th ed.). Washington, DC.
8. Phillips ML, Medford N, Senior C, Bullmore ET, Suckling J, et al. (2001)
Depersonalization disorder: thinking without feeling. Psychiatry Res 108: 145–
160.
9. Sierra M, Senior C, Dalton J, McDonough M, Bond A, et al. (2002) Autonomic
response in depersonalization disorder. Arch Gen Psychiatry 59: 833–838.
10. Lawrence EJ, Shaw P, Baker D, Baron-Cohen S, David AS (2004) Measuring
empathy: reliability and validity of the Empathy Quotient. Psychol Med 34:
911–919.
11. Lawrence EJ, Shaw P, Baker D, Patel M, Sierra-Siegert M, et al. (2007)
Empathy and enduring depersonalization: the role of self-related processes. Soc
Neurosci 2: 292–306.
12. Davis M (1996) Empathy: A Social Psychological Approach. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
13. Lemche E, Anilkumar A, Giampietro VP, Brammer MJ, Surguladze SA, et al.
(2008) Cerebral and autonomic responses to emotional facial expressions in
depersonalisation disorder. Br J Psychiatry 193: 222–228.
14. Lemche E, Surguladze SA, Giampietro VP, Anilkumar A, Brammer MJ, et al.
(2007) Limbic and prefrontal responses to facial emotion expressions in
depersonalization. Neuroreport 18: 473–477.
15. Medford N, Brierley B, Brammer M, Bullmore ET, David AS, et al. (2006)
Emotional memory in depersonalization disorder: a functional MRI study.
Psychiatry Res 148: 93–102.
16. Sierra M, Berrios GE (1998) Depersonalization: neurobiological perspectives.
Biol Psychiatry 44: 898–908.
17. Craig AD (2002) How do you feel? Interoception: the sense of the physiological
condition of the body. Nat Rev Neurosci 3: 655–666.
18. Craig AD (2003) Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the
body. Curr Opin Neurobiol 13: 500–505.
19. Critchley HD, Wiens S, Rotshtein P, Ohman A, Dolan RJ (2004) Neural
systems supporting interoceptive awareness. Nat Neurosci 7: 189–195.
20. Dunn BD, Galton HC, Morgan R, Evans D, Oliver C, et al. (2010) Listening to
your heart. How interoception shapes emotion experience and intuitive
decision making. Psychol Sci 21: 1835–1844.
21. Fukushima H, Terasawa Y, Umeda S (2011) Association between interoception
and empathy: evidence from heartbeat-evoked brain potential.
Int J Psychophysiol 79: 259–265.
22. Pollatos O, Herbert BM, Matthias E, Schandry R (2007) Heart rate response
after emotional picture presentation is modulated by interoceptive awareness.
Int J Psychophysiol 63: 117–124.
23. Pollatos O, Kirsch W, Schandry R (2005) On the relationship between
interoceptive awareness, emotional experience, and brain processes. Brain Res
Cogn Brain Res 25: 948–962.
24. Schandry R (1981) Heart beat perception and emotional experience.
Psychophysiology 18: 483–488.
25. Wiens S, Mezzacapa ES, Katkin ES (2000) Heartbeat detection and the
experience of emotions. Cognition and emotion 14: 417–427.
26. Melloni M, Lopez V, Ibanez A (2013) Empathy and contextual social
cognition. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci.
27. Ibanez A, Aguado J, Baez S, Huepe D, Lopez V, et al. (2013) From neural
signatures of emotional modulation to social cognition: individual differences in
healthy volunteers and psychiatric participants. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci.
28. Hantas MN, Katkin ES, Blascovich J (1982) Relationship between heartbeat
discrimination and subjective experience of affective state [abstract]. Psycho-
physiology 19: 563.
29. Barrett LF, Quigley KS, Bliss-Moreau E, Aronson KR (2004) Interoceptive
sensitivity and self-reports of emotional experience. J Pers Soc Psychol 87: 684–
697.
30. Craig AD (2004) Human feelings: why are some more aware than others?
Trends Cogn Sci 8: 239–241.
31. Craig AD (2009) How do you feel–now? The anterior insula and human
awareness. Nat Rev Neurosci 10: 59–70.
32. Critchley HD, Mathias CJ, Dolan RJ (2001) Neuroanatomical basis for first-
and second-order representations of bodily states. Nat Neurosci 4: 207–212.
33. Damasio AR, Grabowski TJ, Bechara A, Damasio H, Ponto LL, et al. (2000)
Subcortical and cortical brain activity during the feeling of self-generated
emotions. Nat Neurosci 3: 1049–1056.
34. Harrison NA, Gray MA, Gianaros PJ, Critchley HD (2010) The embodiment
of emotional feelings in the brain. J Neurosci 30: 12878–12884.
35. Pollatos O, Gramann K, Schandry R (2007) Neural systems connecting
interoceptive awareness and feelings. Hum Brain Mapp 28: 9–18.
36. Terasawa Y, Fukushima H, Umeda S (2011) How does interoceptive awareness
interact with the subjective experience of emotion? An fMRI Study. Hum
Brain Mapp.
37. Bechara A, Naqvi N (2004) Listening to your heart: interoceptive awareness as
a gateway to feeling. Nat Neurosci 7: 102–103.
38. Lavin C, Melis C, Mikulan E, Gelormini C, Huepe D, et al. (2013) The
anterior cingulate cortex: an integrative hub for human socially-driven
interactions. Front Neurosci 7: 64.
39. Khalsa SS, Rudrauf D, Feinstein JS, Tranel D (2009) The pathways of
interoceptive awareness. Nat Neurosci 12: 1494–1496.
40. Couto B, Salles A, Sedeno L, Peradejordi M, Barttfeld P, et al. (2013) The man
who feels two hearts: the different pathways of interoception. Soc Cogn Affect
Neurosci.
41. Ibanez A, Manes F (2012) Contextual social cognition and the behavioral
variant of frontotemporal dementia. Neurology 78: 1354–1362.
42. Couto B, Manes F, Montanes P, Matallana D, Reyes P, et al. (2013) Structural
neuroimaging of social cognition in progressive non-fluent aphasia and
behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia. Front Hum Neurosci 7: 467.
43. Ibanez A, Gleichgerrcht E, Manes F (2010) Clinical effects of insular damage in
humans. Brain Struct Funct 214: 397–410.
44. Keysers C, Kaas JH, Gazzola V (2010) Somatosensation in social perception.
Nat Rev Neurosci 11: 417–428.
45. Lamm C, Decety J, Singer T (2011) Meta-analytic evidence for common and
distinct neural networks associated with directly experienced pain and empathy
for pain. Neuroimage 54: 2492–2502.
46. Novembre G, Zanon M, Silani G (2014) Empathy for social exclusion involves
the sensory-discriminative component of pain: a within-subject fMRI study.
Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci.
47. Avenanti A, Minio-Paluello I, Bufalari I, Aglioti SM (2009) The pain of a
model in the personality of an onlooker: influence of state-reactivity and
personality traits on embodied empathy for pain. Neuroimage 44: 275–283.
48. Bolognini N, Rossetti A, Convento S, Vallar G (2013) Understanding others’
feelings: the role of the right primary somatosensory cortex in encoding the
affective valence of others’ touch. J Neurosci 33: 4201–4205.
49. Cheng Y, Yang CY, Lin CP, Lee PL, Decety J (2008) The perception of pain in
others suppresses somatosensory oscillations: a magnetoencephalography study.
Neuroimage 40: 1833–1840.
50. Schaefer M, Heinze HJ, Rotte M (2012) Embodied empathy for tactile events:
Interindividual differences and vicarious somatosensory responses during touch
observation. Neuroimage 60: 952–957.
51. Adolphs R, Damasio H, Tranel D, Cooper G, Damasio AR (2000) A role for
somatosensory cortices in the visual recognition of emotion as revealed by
three-dimensional lesion mapping. J Neurosci 20: 2683–2690.
52. Pitcher D, Garrido L, Walsh V, Duchaine BC (2008) Transcranial magnetic
stimulation disrupts the perception and embodiment of facial expressions.
J Neurosci 28: 8929–8933.
53. Avenanti A, Bolognini N, Maravita A, Aglioti SM (2007) Somatic and motor
components of action simulation. Curr Biol 17: 2129–2135.
54. Avenanti A, Bueti D, Galati G, Aglioti SM (2005) Transcranial magnetic
stimulation highlights the sensorimotor side of empathy for pain. Nat Neurosci
8: 955–960.
55. Tsakiris M (2010) My body in the brain: a neurocognitive model of body-
ownership. Neuropsychologia 48: 703–712.
56. Farrer C, Franck N, Georgieff N, Frith CD, Decety J, et al. (2003) Modulating
the experience of agency: a positron emission tomography study. Neuroimage
18: 324–333.
57. Baier B, Karnath HO (2008) Tight link between our sense of limb ownership
and self-awareness of actions. Stroke 39: 486–488.
58. Karnath HO, Baier B, Nagele T (2005) Awareness of the functioning of one’s
own limbs mediated by the insular cortex? J Neurosci 25: 7134–7138.
59. Seth AK, Suzuki K, Critchley HD (2011) An interoceptive predictive coding
model of conscious presence. Front Psychol 2: 395.
60. Lemche E, Brammer MJ, David AS, Surguladze SA, Phillips ML, et al. (2013)
Interoceptive-reflective regions differentiate alexithymia traits in depersonal-
ization disorder. Psychiatry Res 214: 66–72.
61. First MB, Spitzer RL, Gibbon M, Williams JB (2002) Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-IVA Axis I Disorders, Research Version, Patient Edition
(SCID-I/P). New York: New York: Biometrics Research, New Yor State
Psychiatric Institute.
62. Baker D, Hunter E, Lawrence E, Medford N, Patel M, et al. (2003)
Depersonalisation disorder: clinical features of 204 cases. Br J Psychiatry 182:
428–433.
63. Michal M, Kaufhold J, Grabhorn R, Krakow K, Overbeck G, et al. (2005)
Depersonalization and social anxiety. J Nerv Ment Dis 193: 629–632.
Interoception and Emotion in DD
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 15 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e98769
64. Noyes R, Jr., Woodman C, Garvey MJ, Cook BL, Suelzer M, et al. (1992)
Generalized anxiety disorder vs. panic disorder. Distinguishing characteristics
and patterns of comorbidity. J Nerv Ment Dis 180: 369–379.
65. Toni C, Cassano GB, Perugi G, Murri L, Mancino M, et al. (1996)
Psychosensorial and related phenomena in panic disorder and in temporal lobe
epilepsy. Compr Psychiatry 37: 125–133.
66. Sierra M, Baker D, Medford N, David AS (2005) Unpacking the
depersonalization syndrome: an exploratory factor analysis on the Cambridge
Depersonalization Scale. Psychol Med 35: 1523–1532.
67. Molina Castillo JJ, Martinez de la Iglesia J, Albert Colomer C, Berrios G,
Sierra M, et al. (2006) [Cross-cultural adaptation and validation of the
Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale]. Actas Esp Psiquiatr 34: 185–192.
68. Beck AT, Steer RA, Brown GK (1996) Manual for he Beck Depression
Inventory-II: The Psycological Corporation.
69. Spielberg CD, Gorsuch RL, Lushene RE (1970) Manual for the State-Trait
Inventory. Palo Alto: Consulting Pychological Press.
70. Torralva T, Roca M, Gleichgerrcht E, Lopez P, Manes F (2009) INECO
Frontal Screening (IFS): a brief, sensitive, and specific tool to assess executive
functions in dementia. J Int Neuropsychol Soc 15: 777–786.
71. Melloni M, Sedeno L, Couto B, Reynoso M, Gelormini C, et al. (2013)
Preliminary evidence about the effects of meditation on interoceptive sensitivity
and social cognition. Behav Brain Funct 9: 47.
72. Whitehead WE, Drescher VM, Heiman P, Blackwell B (1977) Relation of heart
rate control to heartbeat perception. Biofeedback Self Regul: 371–392.
73. Pennebaker J (1982) The psychology of physical symptoms; Springer, editor.
New York.
74. Brainard DH (1997) The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spat Vis 10: 433–436.
75. Rouse CH, Jones GE, Jones KR (1988) The effect of body composition and
gender on cardiac awareness. Psychophysiology 25: 400–407.
76. Davis M (1983) Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a
multidimensional approach. J Pers Soc Psychol: 113–126.
77. Baez S, Couto B, Herrera E, Bocanegra Y, Trujillo-Orrego N, et al. (2013)
Tracking the Cognitive, Social, and Neuroanatomical Profile in Early
Neurodegeneration: Type III Cockayne Syndrome. Front Aging Neurosci 5:
80.
78. Baez S, Herrera E, Villarin L, Theil D, Gonzalez-Gadea ML, et al. (2013)
Contextual social cognition impairments in schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
PLoS One 8: e57664.
79. Couto B, Sedeno L, Sposato LA, Sigman M, Riccio PM, et al. (2013) Insular
networks for emotional processing and social cognition: comparison of two case
reports with either cortical or subcortical involvement. Cortex 49: 1420–1434.
80. Decety J, Michalska KJ, Kinzler KD (2012) The contribution of emotion and
cognition to moral sensitivity: a neurodevelopmental study. Cereb Cortex 22:
209–220.
81. Supekar K, Menon V (2012) Developmental maturation of dynamic causal
control signals in higher-order cognition: a neurocognitive network model.
PLoS Comput Biol 8: e1002374.
82. Barttfeld P, Wicker B, Cukier S, Navarta S, Lew S, et al. (2012) State-
dependent changes of connectivity patterns and functional brain network
topology in autism spectrum disorder. Neuropsychologia 50: 3653–3662.
83. Tzourio-Mazoyer N, Landeau B, Papathanassiou D, Crivello F, Etard O, et al.
(2002) Automated anatomical labeling of activations in SPM using a
macroscopic anatomical parcellation of the MNI MRI single-subject brain.
Neuroimage 15: 273–289.
84. Supekar K, Menon V, Rubin D, Musen M, Greicius MD (2008) Network
analysis of intrinsic functional brain connectivity in Alzheimer’s disease. PLoS
Comput Biol 4: e1000100.
85. Fox MD, Snyder AZ, Vincent JL, Corbetta M, Van Essen DC, et al. (2005)
The human brain is intrinsically organized into dynamic, anticorrelated
functional networks. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 102: 9673–9678.
86. Raichle ME (2009) A paradigm shift in functional brain imaging. J Neurosci 29:
12729–12734.
87. Barttfeld P, Amoruso L, Ais J, Cukier S, Bavassi L, et al. (In press) Organization
of brain networks governed by long-range connections index autistic traits in
the general population. Journal of Neurodevelopmental Disorders.
88. Barttfeld P, Amoruso L, Ais J, Cukier S, Bavassi L, et al. (2013) Organization of
brain networks governed by long-range connections index autistic traits in the
general population. J Neurodev Disord 5: 16.
89. Barttfeld P, Petroni A, Baez S, Urquina H, Sigman M, et al. (2014) Functional
Connectivity and Temporal Variability of Brain Connections in Adults with
Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and Bipolar Disorder. Neuropsycho-
biology 69: 65–75.
90. Sporns O, Zwi JD (2004) The small world of the cerebral cortex.
Neuroinformatics 2: 145–162.
91. Bullmore E, Sporns O (2009) Complex brain networks: graph theoretical
analysis of structural and functional systems. Nat Rev Neurosci 10: 186–198.
92. Watts DJ, Strogatz SH (1998) Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks.
Nature 393: 440–442.
93. Humphries MD, Gurney K (2008) Network ‘small-world-ness’: a quantitative
method for determining canonical network equivalence. PLoS One 3:
e0002051.
94. Rubinov M, Sporns O (2010) Complex network measures of brain
connectivity: uses and interpretations. Neuroimage 52: 1059–1069.
95. Latora V, Marchiori M (2001) Efficient behavior of small-world networks. Phys
Rev Lett 87: 198701.
96. Crawford JR, Garthwaite PH (2002) Investigation of the single case in
neuropsychology: confidence limits on the abnormality of test scores and test
score differences. Neuropsychologia 40: 1196–1208.
97. Crawford JR, Garthwaite PH, Howell DC (2009) On comparing a single case
with a control sample: an alternative perspective. Neuropsychologia 47: 2690–
2695.
98. Crawford JR, Garthwaite PH, Ryan K (2011) Comparing a single case to a
control sample: testing for neuropsychological deficits and dissociations in the
presence of covariates. Cortex 47: 1166–1178.
99. Crawford JR, Howell DC (1998) Comparing an individual’s test score against
norms derived from small samples. Clin Neuropsychol 12: 482–486.
100. Couto B, Sedeno L, Sposato LA, Sigman M, Riccio PM, et al. (2012) Insular
networks for emotional processing and social cognition: Comparison of two
case reports with either cortical or subcortical involvement. Cortex.
101. Straube T, Weisbrod A, Schmidt S, Raschdorf C, Preul C, et al. (2010) No
impairment of recognition and experience of disgust in a patient with a right-
hemispheric lesion of the insula and basal ganglia. Neuropsychologia 48: 1735–
1741.
102. Ovadia-Caro S, Nir Y, Soddu A, Ramot M, Hesselmann G, et al. (2012)
Reduction in inter-hemispheric connectivity in disorders of consciousness.
PLoS One 7: e37238.
103. Biswal BB, Mennes M, Zuo XN, Gohel S, Kelly C, et al. (2010) Toward
discovery science of human brain function. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 107:
4734–4739.
104. Buckner RL, Andrews-Hanna JR, Schacter DL (2008) The brain’s default
network: anatomy, function, and relevance to disease. Ann N Y Acad Sci 1124:
1–38.
105. Buckner RL, Vincent JL (2007) Unrest at rest: default activity and spontaneous
network correlations. Neuroimage 37: 1091–1096; discussion 1097–1099.
106. Greicius M (2008) Resting-state functional connectivity in neuropsychiatric
disorders. Curr Opin Neurol 21: 424–430.
107. van den Heuvel MP, Hulshoff Pol HE (2010) Exploring the brain network: a
review on resting-state fMRI functional connectivity. Eur Neuropsychophar-
macol 20: 519–534.
108. Beckmann CF, DeLuca M, Devlin JT, Smith SM (2005) Investigations into
resting-state connectivity using independent component analysis. Philos
Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 360: 1001–1013.
109. Biswal B, Yetkin FZ, Haughton VM, Hyde JS (1995) Functional connectivity in
the motor cortex of resting human brain using echo-planar MRI. Magn Reson
Med 34: 537–541.
110. Damoiseaux JS, Rombouts SA, Barkhof F, Scheltens P, Stam CJ, et al. (2006)
Consistent resting-state networks across healthy subjects. Proc Natl Acad
Sci U S A 103: 13848–13853.
111. De Luca M, Beckmann CF, De Stefano N, Matthews PM, Smith SM (2006)
fMRI resting state networks define distinct modes of long-distance interactions
in the human brain. Neuroimage 29: 1359–1367.
112. Dosenbach NU, Nardos B, Cohen AL, Fair DA, Power JD, et al. (2010)
Prediction of individual brain maturity using fMRI. Science 329: 1358–1361.
113. Salvador R, Suckling J, Coleman MR, Pickard JD, Menon D, et al. (2005)
Neurophysiological architecture of functional magnetic resonance images of
human brain. Cereb Cortex 15: 1332–1342.
114. van den Heuvel M, Mandl R, Hulshoff Pol H (2008) Normalized cut group
clustering of resting-state FMRI data. PLoS One 3: e2001.
115. Sporns O, Honey CJ (2006) Small worlds inside big brains. Proc Natl Acad
Sci U S A 103: 19219–19220.
116. Sierra M, Lopera F, Lambert MV, Phillips ML, David AS (2002) Separating
depersonalisation and derealisation: the relevance of the ‘‘lesion method’’.
J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 72: 530–532.
117. Decety J, Grezes J (2006) The power of simulation: imagining one’s own and
other’s behavior. Brain Res 1079: 4–14.
118. Gallagher S (2005) How the body shapes the mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
119. Ibanez A, Huepe D, Gempp R, Gutie´rrez V, Rivera-Rei A, et al. (2013)
Empathy, sex and fluid intelligence as predictors of theory of mind. Personality
and Individual Differences 54: 616–621.
120. Decety J, Jackson PL (2004) The functional architecture of human empathy.
Behav Cogn Neurosci Rev 3: 71–100.
121. Iacoboni M (2005) Understanding others: imitation, language, empathy. In:
Hurley S, Chater, N., editor.Perspectives on Imitation: from Cognitive
Neuroscience to Social Science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
122. Keysers C, Wicker B, Gazzola V, Anton JL, Fogassi L, et al. (2004) A touching
sight: SII/PV activation during the observation and experience of touch.
Neuron 42: 335–346.
123. Wicker B, Keysers C, Plailly J, Royet JP, Gallese V, et al. (2003) Both of us
disgusted in My insula: the common neural basis of seeing and feeling disgust.
Neuron 40: 655–664.
124. Iacoboni M (2009) Imitation, empathy, and mirror neurons. Annu Rev Psychol
60: 653–670.
125. Rizzolatti G, Fogassi L, Gallese V (2006) Mirrors of the mind. Sci Am 295: 54–
61.
126. Singer T, Lamm C (2009) The social neuroscience of empathy. Ann N Y Acad
Sci 1156: 81–96.
Interoception and Emotion in DD
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 16 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e98769
127. Baron-Cohen S, Wheelwright S, Hill J, Raste Y, Plumb I (2001) The ‘‘Reading
the Mind in the Eyes’’ Test revised version: a study with normal adults, and
adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. J Child Psychol
Psychiatry 42: 241–251.
128. Davis M (1980) A multidimensional approach to individual differences in
empathy. Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology. pp. 85.
129. Ernst J, Northoff G, Boker H, Seifritz E, Grimm S (2012) Interoceptive
awareness enhances neural activity during empathy. Hum Brain Mapp.
130. Sierra M, Medford N, Wyatt G, David AS (2012) Depersonalization disorder
and anxiety: a special relationship? Psychiatry Res 197: 123–127.
Interoception and Emotion in DD
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 17 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e98769
